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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

THE STATE OF UTAH,

Plaintiff/ Appellee,
-v.Case No. 20060221
District Court No. 051400059

ELIZABETH M. DESEELHORST,

Defendant / Appellant.
BRIEF OF THE APPELLEE

STATEMENT O F JURISDICTION

Defendant appeals a conviction for Negligent Homicide, a class A misdemeanor,
in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-206, in the Third Judicial District Court in Salt
Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Royal I. Hansen presiding. This Court's
jurisdiction is based upon Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e).
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARD O F REVIEW

Issue 1: In challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, did Defendant properly
marshal the evidence in support of the jury's guilty verdict?
Standard of Review: To properly marshal the evidence, a defendant must
"present, in comprehensive and fastidious order, every scrap of competent evidence
introduced at trial which supports the very findings the appellant resists," then
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demonstrate that there is a "fatal flaw in the evidence." West Valley City v. Majestic Inv.
Co., 818 P.2d 1311, 1315 (Utah App.1991) (emphasis in original).
Issue 2: Assuming Defendant properly marshaled the evidence, is the evidence
sufficient to show a gross deviation from the accepted standard of care and criminal
culpability when a driver sees a bicyclist in front of her, allows her vehicle to travel
outside of her lane, and takes no action to avoid running the bicycle over from behind?
Standard of Review: To review a claim of sufficiency of the evidence the court
reviews the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, and only overturns the
conviction when the evidence is so inconclusive or improbable that a reasonable jury
must have entertained a reasonable doubt. State v. Brown, 948 P.2d 337, 343 (Utah
1991).
Issue 3: Is a doctor's testimony an alternative hypothesis when the doctor can't
specifically date when the Defendant suffered medical conditions and could not
conclusively state from what medical conditions the defendant suffered?
Standard of review: It is the jury's duty to weigh alternative reasonable
hypotheses and determine which they believe, State v. Blubaugh, 904 P.2d 688, 694-695
(Utah Ct. App. 1995) but the prosecution is not required to rebut every hypothesis
however unsubstantial or incredible. State v. John, 586 P.2d 410 (Utah 1978).
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STATUTES

"Criminal homicide constitutes negligent homicide if the actor, acting with
criminal negligence, causes the death of another." Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-206
"A person engages in conduct: ... With criminal negligence or is criminally
negligent with respect to circumstances surrounding his conduct or the result of his
conduct when he ought to be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the
circumstances exist or the result will occur. The risk must be of such a nature and degree
that the failure to perceive it constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that
an ordinary person would exercise in all the circumstances as viewed from the actor's
standpoint." Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103(4).
FACTS

September 18, 2004 was a clear, dry day. (R. 152 pp. 176). It was a little bit
breezy. (R. 152 pp. 176.) Josie Johnson was riding her bicycle (a vehicle under Utah
Law) up the canyon; she was riding on the right hand side of the road near the fog line.
(R. 153 pp. 257, 315; Jury Inst. 15.)
Elizabeth DeSeelhorst (hereafter "the Defendant") was driving her Jeep Cherokee
up Big Cottonwood canyon to her home at Solitude Ski Resort after grocery shopping.
(R. 153 pp. 396; R. 152 pp. 185.) Living in the canyon, the Defendant is very familiar
with the fact that bicyclists often ride up the canyon. (R. 153 pp. 433.) The Defendant
was driving in the right hand lane of travel when the road split into two uphill lanes. (Ex.
P-5.) She always drives in the right lane. (R. 153 pp. 408.) After hitting Josie Johnson,
the Defendant filled out an accident report. (R. 152, pp. 154-55.) The accident report
-3-

filled out by the Defendant states that she was driving between 35 and 40 miles per hour.
(Ex. P-16.) The speed limit where the accident occurred is 45 miles per hour. (R. 153
pp. 343.) The police officers who investigated the collision were not able to estimate the
speed that the Defendant was driving, and could not contradict or corroborate the speed
that the Defendant claimed in the accident report. (R. 152 pp. 190-91.) 30 miles per hour
is the same as 44.001 feet per second, and 40 miles per hour is the same as 58.6 feet per
second. (R. 153 pp. 301-02.)
The Defendant stated on the police accident report that she saw a bicyclist when
the bicyclist was 150 feet in front of her. (Ex. P-16.) The Defendant also told her
husband at the scene that she saw something moving in front of her. (R. 153 pp. 363.)
The Defendant also told Dr. Foley over a year after the collision that she saw motion
behind the trees. (R. 153 pp. 467.) One of the first witnesses at the scene, Jay Carey Jr.,
also spoke with the Defendant. (R. 153 pp. 256). The Defendant told Mr. Carey that the
bicyclist was traveling the same direction that the Defendant was driving. (R. 153 pp.
257). After telling Mr. Carey that she saw the bicyclist and which direction it was
traveling, the Defendant stated that she didn't think she should be saying anything. (R.
153 pp. 257-58.)
When the collision occurred, the Defendant's right tires were over the fog line, to
the right of the designated lane of travel, very near or off the asphalt in the dirt shoulder.
(R. 153 pp. 294.) The very center of the sport utility vehicle that the Defendant was
driving struck Josie Johnson's bicycle. (R. 152 pp, 187-88.) This fact was evidenced by
a rubber smudge mark between the numbers and letters of the Jeep's front license plate
-4-

which had fallen off of the Jeep and was lying in the roadway. (R. 152 pp. 187-88.) The
evidence also showed that the impact between Josie Johnson and the Defendant's vehicle
approximately occurred with the Defendant's vehicle approaching from a five o'clock
position and Josie Johnson traveling in the direction of the eleven o'clock position. (R.
153 pp. 284.)
The Defendant remembered the impact of the bicyclist onto her jeep. (R. 153 pp.
415.) The Defendant stated that she remembered something hitting her vehicle and
stated, "I don't remember hitting something. I remember something hitting me." (R.
153 pp. 415.) She also remembered her vehicle being stopped in the middle of the road
and driving it carefully to the side of the road after the collision. (R. 153 pp. 416-17.)
Where the collision occurred, the road is in a long gradual curve. (Ex. P-5.) The
Jeep was parked 190 feet from the point of impact, the position to which the Defendant
drove it after being stopped in the middle of the road. (R. 152 pp. 208; R. 153 pp. 417.)
The Defendant stated that she has had issues with her memory since 1991. (R.
153 pp. 418, 392.) She saw a doctor on November 4, 2004, a few weeks after the
collision and filled out a self report of symptoms. (R. 153 pp. 422-24.) On the self report
she did not state that she had any problems with her memory because it was an ongoing
thing that she had talked about to her doctor. (R. 153 pp. 425.) She stated that, her
memory problems hadn't gotten worse or better and stated the memory issues were like
losing her purse. (R. 153 pp. 426.) She also testified that the memory loss from an
experience like the crash could not relate to something like losing her purse. (R. 153 pp.
431.)
-5-

The Defendant saw Dr. Foley on Nov. 4, 2005, over a year after the collision and
reported memory loss from the collision. (R. 153 pp. 468.) Dr. Foley saw indications of
numerous medical conditions in the Defendant's MRIs, but could not date the events. (R.
153 pp. 455-56, 472-74.) Dr. Foley compared 2 MRIs, one from 1991 and one he took
in November 2005; he saw many changes between the films but stated that the changes
could have occurred at any time between 1991 through 2005 either prior to, or after the
collision in 2004. (R. 153 pp. 472-74.) The information from 1991 that Dr. Foley used
was a radiological report, and he did not have the actual films to analyze. (R. 153 pp.
472.) The Defendant was put on Dailantin in 1994 - after the base MRI that Dr. Foley
used. (R. 153 pp. 449.) Dialantin is used to prevent the types of seizures that he
observed in her brain. (R. 153 pp. 449.) Dr. Foley could not state when the mini seizures
occurred, and they could all have occurred prior to her being placed on Dailantin. (R.
153 pp. 449, 474-75.) Additionally Dr. Foley could not state what type of medical
episode occurred to cause the lesions he observed. (R. 153 pp. 477-78, 469.) They
medical conditions that Dr. Foley said may have happened typically last between 30
seconds and a minute and a half. (R. 153 pp. 459.) The episodes generally do not last for
one or two seconds. (R. 153 pp. 460.)
Dr. Foley used the Defendant's self reporting to base his medical opinion. (R. 153
pp. 465-67.) The story the Defendant gave Dr. Foley was different from what she said at
the scene. (R. 153 pp. 464-65.)
Josie Johnson died because of injuries received in the collision. (R. 152. pp. 198).
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SUMMARY O F ARGUMENT

The Defendant did not properly marshal the evidence for this court to consider the
question of sufficiency, but assuming arguendo the evidence was fully marshaled, the
jury verdict is well supported. The Defendant is guilty of criminal negligent homicide
having been convicted by a jury. Criminal negligence is a gross deviation from the
required standard of care. Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-206. The question of criminal
negligence is a fact-specific inquiry that requires looking at all of the circumstances.
State v. Riddle, 188 P.2d 449, 453 (Utah 1948). The Defendant saw a bicycle ahead of
her as she drove up a winding canyon road. Instead of taking any action to avoid hitting
the bicycle, the Defendant allowed her vehicle to travel outside of its lane of travel and
hit the bicycle from behind. The jury heard this evidence and determined that it was a
gross deviation from the standard of care.
The jury's finding the Defendant guilty is also supported by case law in Utah. In
State v. Riddle, 188 P.2d 449, the Utah Supreme Court upheld a criminal negligence
conviction where the defendant allowed his car to travel outside of its lane while going
around a corner. The Defendant relies on State v. Larsen, 999 P.2d 1252 (Utah 2000),
but this case specifically stated that a major factor in overturning the conviction was the
evidence showing that the defendant did not see the car he collided with. Taking the
evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, the Defendant in this case saw the
bicyclist in her lane prior to hitting her from behind. In Riddle the defendant did not see
the car before the collision, yet the court upheld the conviction. There is more evidence
in the case at hand to uphold a verdict of guilty of criminally negligent homicide.
-7-

The jury heard different stories from the Defendant and judged her credibility.
The jury also heard the testimony of Dr. Foley and judged his credibility and the
reasonableness of his alternative explanation.
The evidence supports a verdict of guilty, and the jury determined that the
Defendant's action were criminally culpable and did not find her story credible.
Additionally the jury did not find the alternative explanation of Dr. Foley reasonable.
The verdict is supported and should be upheld.
ARGUMENT
I:

DEFENDANT FAILED T O MARSHALL T H E EVIDENCE.

Defendant's challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence fails because she has not
met the threshold requirement for such a challenge—marshalling the evidence supporting
the jury verdict. To properly marshal the evidence, a Defendant must "present, in
comprehensive and fastidious order, every scrap of competent evidence introduced at trial
which supports the very findings the appellant resists," then demonstrate that there is a
"fatal flaw in the evidence." West Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311,1315
(Utah App.1991) (emphasis in original). "The gravity of this flaw must be sufficient to
convince the appellate court that the trial court's finding resting upon the evidence is
clearly erroneous." Id. at 1315. The marshaling requirement entails reverse advocacy,
i.e.: "an exhaustive or voluminous recitation of all the facts presented at trial, even if this
recitation includes within its body the facts that support the challenged ruling." Neely v.
Bennett, 2002 UT App 189, f 12, 51 P.3d 724, cert, denied 59 P.3d 603 (2002). A party
fails to properly marshal where he merely reargues the evidence favorable to his position.
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Id. When an appellant fails to meet the "heavy burden" of marshaling the evidence, the
appellate court will assume that the record supports the findings of the trial court. Moon
v. Moon, 1999 UT App 12, f 24, 973 P.2d 431. The Defendant fails to collect all of the
evidence that the jury may have considered in determining their verdict.
The Defendant covers select facts from the trial, but she does not include several
facts that support the jury's finding and merely reargues the evidence in favor of her
position. In reciting the evidence, the Defendant insists that there is no evidence that she
attempted to brake or turn her vehicle. The evidence at trial showed that the Defendant
failed to avoid hitting the bicyclist in front of her, but the evidence also shows that the
Defendant turned her vehicle with the road's curve, came to a stop in the middle of the
road after striking the bicyclist, and then drove her car and parked it at the side of the
road at which point the vehicle was only 190 feet from the point of impact. This
evidence shows that the Defendant both turned her vehicle and applied the brakes. The
debris line just shows that the Defendant did not deviate from her direction of travel or
swerve after striking Josie Johnson, it shows that she came to a controlled stop after the
collision. Additional evidence at trial was the Defendant's statement that she always
drives on the right side of the road. This statement was not marshaled by the Defendant,
but it could have been considered by the jury as part of the reason why she took no action
to avoid hitting the bicyclist. The Defendant also states that there was evidence at trial
that she saw motion behind trees, but she does not marshal the evidence about the
inconsistency in her testimony in regards to this. The evidence from the witness that the
Defendant not only saw motion, but was able to identify which direction the bicycle was
-9-

traveling prior to the collision was also omitted. The evidence at trial in addition to the
police report was testimony from both her husband and Dr. Foley that the Defendant
stated that she saw motion behind trees. Additionally the Defendant's own written
statement at the scene stated that she saw the bicyclist before hitting her from behind. Dr.
Foley learned that the Defendant saw motion behind the trees when he talked to her in
November 2005, over a year after the collision, and only a few weeks before the trial.
The fact that there is testimony from multiple witnesses contradicting the Defendant's
claim that she did not see the bicyclist before hitting her is important to the jury in
determining what really happened and judging the credibility of the Defendant. Another
factor that the jury likely considered, which was not marshaled, is the fact that the
Defendant was able to tell one of the first witnesses on the scene that she and the bicyclist
were traveling in the same direction, another statement that contradicts the Defendant's
statement that she did not see the bicyclist before the impact. Another fact that was not
marshaled is that there are two uphill (the direction the Defendant was traveling) lanes
where the collision occurred. The jury could have considered this in determining whether
the Defendant was criminally negligent by not avoiding the collision.
The evidence regarding Dr. Foley's testimony is not marshaled either. The
Defendant only discusses a few aspects of the doctor's testimony and omits several
important factors of his testimony that the jury could have considered in determining
whether it was a reasonable alternative hypothesis. Dr. Foley was not able to specify
what medical condition the Defendant had, only that there are several different medical
conditions that cause episodes of recall problems. Dr. Foley also testified that he saw
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indications in the MRI that the Defendant had several neurological abnormalities, but he
could not date the abnormalities any time within 14 years between the two MRIs he
compared. Dr. Foley also used the Defendant's story of what happened to help him make
a diagnosis, but the story he heard about what happened was different from what the
Defendant said at the scene, and it contradicts testimony from other witnesses. Also at
trial Dr. Foley testified that the neurological conditions that he was referring to do not last
only a couple seconds and are typically 30 seconds to a minute and a half, or at least 15 to
30 seconds. The police officer testified how long it takes to travel certain distances, and
to travel the distance of the debris path would take only a few seconds. The evidence is
inconsistent with the doctor's scenario of the Defendant suffering from a condition that
would last at least 15 seconds. None of this evidence from Dr. Foley's testimony was
marshaled.
When marshaling evidence, all of the evidence the jury may have considered in
reaching their verdict needs to be gathered for the court. In a case of criminally negligent
homicide, whether the act was criminally negligent or not depends on the totality of the
circumstances, so all of the circumstances of the accident need to be considered. There is
significant evidence that the jury could have based its opinion on that the Defendant
neglected to mention when she listed a few factors that she felt the jury may have
considered. The Defendant did not meet her burden of marshalling the evidence, and her
sufficiency claim should be denied for this alone.
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II:

THERE IS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE SUPPORTING THE JURY'S VERDICT THAT THE

DEFENDANT IS GUILTY OF CRIMINALLY NEGLIGENT HOMICIDE.

The Defendant was found guilty of criminally negligent homicide by a jury, and
that verdict is well supported by the evidence. When a jury verdict is reviewed for
sufficiency of the evidence, the evidence and all inferences which may reasonably be
drawn from it are viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict. State v. Brown, 948
P.2d 337, 343 (Utah 1991). The conviction will only be reversed, "when the evidence, so
viewed, is sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable minds must
have entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime of which he
[or she] was convicted. Id. The evidence can be circumstantial so long as it supports
each element of the crime and the logical and reasonable inferences from that evidence
are sufficient to prove each element beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. The Supreme Court
of Utah applied the standard to criminal negligence in State v. Clark, when it stated:
All reasonable minds might not themselves have concluded as the jury did but if it
cannot properly be said that others who so concluded were unreasonable in
arriving at such a conclusion then those circumstances should support a conclusion
of criminal negligence.
223 P.2d 184, 189 (Utah 1950). If the court can not say that the jury was unreasonable,
then it should uphold the jury verdict. Id.
Criminally negligent homicide is committed when a person causes the death of
another while acting with criminal negligence. Utah Code Ann. §76-5-206.
There is no dispute that Josie Johnson's death was caused by the Defendant. The
Defendant only claims insufficient evidence to the element of the crime that she was
criminally negligent.
-12-

A:

THE FACTS SHOW THAT THE DEFENDANT WAS CRIMINALLY NEGLIGENT.

The facts surrounding the accident support the jury's conclusion that the
Defendant was criminally negligent. Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-206 defines criminal
negligence as failure to perceive a substantial and unjustifiable risk to the degree of a
gross deviation from the ordinary person's standard of care. Criminal negligence is a
gross deviation from the required standard of care, and is a higher standard then simple
negligence used in civil trials. State v. Larsen, 999 P.2d 1252, 1256 (Utah 2000).
Criminal negligence depends on all the surrounding circumstances and actions that may
not amount to criminal negligence in all circumstances can be in others. State v. Riddle,
188 P.2d 449, 453 (Utah 1948). Mere inattentiveness is not enough to find criminal
negligence, unless the quality of the act makes it so. State v. Boss, 111 P.3d 1236, 1238
(Utah Ct.App. 2005) (citing Larsen, 999 P.2d at 1257). Other states also use criminal
negligence as a standard, and the Court of Appeals of New York explained the standard
when it stated:
Our decisions construing these provisions have emphasized that criminal liability
cannot be predicated on every act of carelessness resulting in death, that the
carelessness required for criminal negligence is appreciably more serious than that
for ordinary civil negligence, and that the carelessness must be such that its
seriousness would be apparent to anyone who shares the community's general
sense of right and wrong.
People v. Boudin, 555 N.E. 253, 254 (N.Y. 1990)(see also Tello v. State, 180 S.W.3d
150, 158 (Tex.Cr.App. 2005)(Texas court citing and using the New York court's
standard)).
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In Riddle the Utah Supreme Court stated that allowing a vehicle to travel outside
its lane of travel can be criminal negligence. The court reasoned that because the
defendant allowed his vehicle to travel outside of its lane while making a corner and
failed to see another vehicle traveling in a lawful manner, "reasonable minds not only
might fairly conclude that he was guilty of 'reckless conduct or conduct evincing a
marked disregard for the safety of others' but could hardly conclude otherwise."1 Riddle,
188 P.2d at 464.

The conviction of criminally negligent homicide was upheld against

Riddle. In Riddle, the defendant didn't even see the vehicle he collided with, whereas in
this case the Defendant was traveling on a curved road and when she observed a vehicle
traveling lawfully in her lane of travel, she refused to change lanes to pass the slower
moving vehicle. Instead, she proceeded to cut the corner allowing her vehicle to travel
outside of the lane of travel - striking the bicycle with the exact center of her vehicle.
The jury was reasonable in concluding that this was criminally negligent, and "could
hardly have concluded otherwise."
The Defendant's reliance on Larsen is misplaced. Not all collisions on the road
have criminal liability, but in Larsen, the court stated that the only relevant information
about the accident was that defendant did not see an oncoming vehicle when he turned
left in front of it and caused the accident. 999 P.2d 1252. Mere inattentiveness was not
enough for the court to uphold the conviction. Id. In the case at hand the Defendant
stated on the police report that she saw a bicyclist 150 feet in front of her. The Defendant
1

"Reckless conduct or conduct evincing a marked disregard for the safety of others" is the definition criminal
negligence used by the Riddle court, the Utah Court of Appeals has later called the use of the term "reckless" in
defining criminal negligence "unfortunate". State v. Boss, 127 P.3d 1236.
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also told her husband that she saw something moving in front of her before striking the
bicyclist, and over a year after the accident she told Dr. Foley that she saw something
moving in front of her before the collision. The Defendant also was able to tell Mr.
Carey at the scene that the bicycle was traveling the same direction that she was. Only at
trial did the Defendant change her story to not remembering what happened. Unlike
Larsen, the Defendant saw the vehicle with which she collided, and drove in a way as to
not avoid running down the slower vehicle from behind.
In Boudin, 555 N.E. 253, the New York court also relied on the fact that the
defendant did not see the vehicle he collided with to overturn a criminally negligent
conviction. The evidence only showed that the, "defendant inexplicably failed to see the
vehicle until he was so close that he could not prevent the collision." Again, Boudin was
a case where the defendant did not see the other vehicle so could not take any action to
avoid hitting it. In the Defendant's case there was evidence that the she saw the bicycle
ahead of her and did not take any action to avoid hitting it. The Defendant did not merely
fail to see something; she saw something and failed to avoid it.
In a case that is similar to the case at hand, the Supreme Court of Mississippi
upheld a manslaughter conviction under a criminal negligence statute when a motorist ran
a bicyclist over from behind. See Hatcher v. State, 92 So.2d 552 (Mississippi 1957)2.
The important factors in Hatcher included:
The all-important fact is the impact took place within 2 feet of the right edge of the
pavement. Hatcher admits that he saw the child 100 yards ahead of him. He made
2

The Mississippi court defined the standard of care in the case as, "the gist of the offense of involuntary
manslaughter with a motor vehicle is criminal negligence, which must be wanton or reckless under circumstances
implying danger to human life." Hatcher, 92 So.2d at 554. This is similar standard as the standard in Utah.
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no effort to turn his car to the left and pass the child, although no vehicle was
approaching from the north in the west lane of travel. His theory is the child either
turned in ahead of him or swerved to the left into the side of the automobile.
Id. At 554. The court concluded that the defendant "was guilty of culpable negligence in
hitting the child under the circumstances, certainly the jury was amply justified in so
finding." Id. In the case at hand, Defendant admitted seeing Josie Johnson in front of her
on the road and did not take action to pass. In this case the Defendant would not even of
had to move into an oncoming traffic lane to pass the bicycle because there are two lanes
of travel in the direction that she was traveling where the collision occurred. Finally, in
another similarity between this case and Hatcher, the Defendant stated, in her written
statement at the scene, that the bicyclist swerved in front of her car. The evidence does
not support the statement in the police report, and the Defendant changed her story, but
she maintained that she, "did not hit someone, someone hit me." This case is factually
similar to Hatcher, and this jury, similarly to the Hatcher jury, was, "amply justified" in
finding criminal negligence.
In this case there is enough evidence to constitute criminal negligence. Even with
the Defendant's several different explanations for what she did or did not see, the
evidence showed that she saw a bicyclist in front of her and took no action to avoid
running into the bicycle from behind. The Defendant was well aware that bicyclists often
ride up the canyon road where the collision occurred. The evidence also shows that the
bicycle was at the side of the road, and the Defendant allowed her vehicle to travel
outside of her lane of travel when taking a corner up the hill in the canyon. The
Defendant did not need to move into a lane for oncoming traffic to avoid the bicycle but
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did not even move into the other uphill lane. All of the evidence showed that the
Defendant saw the bicyclist in front of her and still ran the bicyclist over from behind.
This evidence clearly is enough to establish a gross deviation from the standard of care
required while driving.
B:

THE JURY DETERMINATION OF THE CRIMINAL CULPABILITY SHOULD BE UPHELD.

The jury determines what the community standard of care is and what a gross
deviation of the expected standard of care would be. If the facts of a case can support a
conclusion of criminal negligence, then culpability is a question for the jury. State v.
Clark, 223 P.2d 184, 189 (Utah, 1950). The term "gross deviation", "creates a jury
question on the issue so that all of the circumstances can be taken into account." State v.
Owens, 638 P.2d 1182, 1184 (Utah, 1981)(analyzing "gross deviation" as used in the
theft statute, U.C.A. § 76-6-410). The Supreme Court of Illinois also stated that the
question of criminal negligence is a question for the jury. People v. Herkless, 196 N.E.
829, 833 (111. 1935).
In every case of criminal negligence all of the evidence needs to be examined, and
then the jury determines if that evidence constitutes a gross deviation from the accepted
standard of care. The jury is comprised of members of the community who can
determine what the community standard is, and if the evidence they observe is a gross
deviation from that standard, they convict. In this case taking all inferences in favor of
the verdict, the jury clearly determined that failing to take any action to avoid hitting a
bicyclist a lane of travel when doing so was absolutely feasible is a gross deviation from
the standard of care. Not only does the evidence uphold the jury's verdict, but the jury
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determined that there is criminal culpability when an individual hits a bicyclist from
behind that the driver sees in the road ahead of him or her.
As with all types accidents, there may not be criminal negligence every time a
motorist hits a bicycle, but when all the facts of this case are examined, there is ample
evidence to conclude that the Defendant was criminally negligent, and because the
evidence supports it, the jury's determination that the Defendant's conduct was a gross
deviation from the standard of care should be upheld.
Ill:

DR. FOLEY'S TESTIMONY WAS NOT AN ALTERNATIVE REASONABLE HYPOTHISIS

AND IT WAS REJECTED BY THE JURY.

The jury's verdict rejected Dr. Foley's testimony and found that it was not a
reasonable hypothesis. When alternative reasonable hypotheses are presented to a jury, it
is their role to weigh the testimony and determine which explanation they believe. See
State v. Blubaugh, 904 P.2d 688, 694-695 (Utah Ct. App. 1995).

The state does not

need to exclude every alternative hypothesis, "however unsubstantial or incredible, which
a party to such a controversy may dream up." State v. John, 586 P.2d 410 (Utah 1978).
Additionally, the alternative hypothesis must be "a reasonable one consistent with the
circumstances and facts proved." State v. Tanner, 675 P.2d 539, (Utah 1983), (quoting
Huerta v. State, 635 S.W.2d 847 (Tex. App. 1982), (quoting from Flores v. State, 551
S.W.2d 364, 367 (Tex. App. 1977)))(emphasis in original). Additionally the jury is "the
exclusive judge of both the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given particular
evidence," State v. Workman, 852 P.2d 981, 984 (Utah 1993). The jury was instructed on
their role in determining credibility, and also given an instruction about alternative
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reasonable hypothesis and how those need to play into their deliberation. The jury
listened to the evidence and determined that the alternative hypothesis was not
reasonable.
The Defendant argues that they presented unrebutted testimony from Dr. Foley,
but the testimony was indefinite, inconsistent, and did not explain the factual situation of
the accident. Dr. Foley effectively rebutted his own explanation of the accident making it
unnecessary for the State to do so. Dr. Foley testified that Defendant's MRI showed
several abnormalities, and these abnormalities were caused by some sort of seizure or
small stroke. These seizures are characterized by episodes of partial consciousness that
last for 15-30 seconds not 2-3 seconds. Dr. Foley testified that someone experiencing
this type of episode would not be able to process information coming to them as a driver.
During direct examination by the Defendant's attorney, this exchange took place:
Dr Foley: And my feeling is that she is, no question, at a very high risk of having
suffered a recurrent small stroke, mini stroke, or a partial complex seizure which
would have rendered her unable to take appropriate action at a critical juncture.
Defense Attorney: And to what degree of certainty can you give us that opinion,
Doctor?
Dr. Foley: Well, I think that - that to a - 1 mean, I can't - well, to a reasonable
degree of medical certainty....
R. 153 p. 469. Immediately after stating that the Defendant was at risk for a myriad of
possible medical conditions that would have made her unable to take appropriate action,
Dr. Foley was hesitant on stating that conclusion to any degree of certainty. This is the
unrebutted testimony that the Defendant wanted the jury to accept as an alternate
reasonable hypothesis.
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Additionally the Defendant was driving her vehicle at least 30 miles per hour up a
winding canyon road, and the accident occurred on a long curve. If the Defendant was,
"unable to take appropriate action at a critical juncture," how could she drive her vehicle
in control through long winding curves in the road? The Defendant tries to argue that
because there is maybe 150 feet of straight line debris that she was having a mini stroke.
At the speeds the Defendant was traveling (which notably come from her accounts on the
accident report - the same accident report that they claim is inaccurate) she would have
traveled the 150 feet in approximately 3 seconds. If the straight line of debris showed
that the Defendant was suffering from an episode of partial consciousness, the straight
line would have continued for the duration of the episode. Dr. Foley was unclear on how
long the partial seizures last and stated:
Dr. Foley: You can have an alteration in consciousness that is 30 seconds or 20
seconds in duration. Probably, the typical partial seizure is - is somewhere
between 30 seconds and a minute and a half.
(R. 153 pp. 459.) After further prodding by the defense attorney he continued:
Dr. Foley: Yeah. It's - as I mentioned, basically the typical duration probably is,
in general, under a minute.
Defense Attorney: Under a minute? Can it be less than that?
Dr. Foley: Yes. No, absolutely. I think you generally don't see partial complex
seizures as being one or two seconds. But beyond that, more in the neighborhood
of 15, 20, 30 seconds, I think, certainly is still within the realm of what a partial
complex seizures generation can - can produce.
(R. 153, pp. 460.) Dr. Foley was uncertain as to the minimum duration and gave two
different estimations of what a typical duration of a partial seizure would be. He then
was not absolute about the minimum duration of a partial seizure. The jury was able to
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consider Dr. Foley's confidence in his own answer's when they considered if his
explanation was an alternative reasonable hypothesis. Following the testimony that these
types of mental episodes do not last 2 or 3 seconds and the defense claim that the straight
line is evidence that she was having this medical condition - the straight line would have
continued for hundreds more feet and the Defendant would have been off of the road
somewhere in the trees. The evidence is not consistent with the testimony of Dr. Foley.
Another flaw with the testimony of Dr. Foley is that he could not date any of the
incidents in the Defendant's brain that he observed in the MRIs. The "episodes" could
have occurred any time between the first MRI in 1991 and the second taken in November
2005 with the exception of a few weeks immediately prior to the more recent MRI. The
lesions on the MRI that Dr. Foley identified could have happened years before, or
sometime in the year after the date when the Defendant caused the death of Josie
Johnson.
Even if one assumes the testimony of Dr. Foley can not be rebutted, the jury was
presented evidence that the Defendant had several periods of partial consciousness
through out the past years. These episodes of not knowing what happened were so
common that the Defendant did not report any new memory issues at a doctor's
appointment on November 12th 2004, approximately 2 months after the accident. These
episodes of partial consciousness rendered her unable to process information that is being
received for 15-30 seconds at a minimum. If the jury were forced to believe the
testimony of Dr. Foley, the evidence still supports a charge of criminal negligence for the
fact that the Defendant was driving up the canyon in the first place. Choosing to operate
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a motor vehicle the driver knows he or she is subject to episodes of partial consciousness
on a regular enough basis that he or she don't report them to his or her doctor shows a
gross deviation from the required standard of care by not being aware of the substantial
unjustifiable risk that one of these episodes will occur resulting in drastic consequences.
The jury also could consider this possibility as it was argued in closing arguments. (R.
154 pp. 535.)
The testimony of Dr. Foley is not a reasonable explanation of what occurred. The
jury is not required to entertain alternative explanations that are not reasonable, and
clearly they rejected the Dr's testimony.
CONCLUSION

The court should uphold the jury's verdict because sufficient evidence of criminal
negligence was presented at trial. The jury saw all the evidence and listened to all of the
testimony, including the Defendant herself. The jury was instructed on the definition of
criminal negligence, including a clarifying instruction based on Boss and Lars en. The
jury determined that the Defendant was criminally negligent because she saw a bicyclist
in front of her, failed to move out of the right hand lane, cut the corner with her right
wheels over the fog line, and struck Josie Johnson from behind killing her. For these
reasons stated in the brief, the State respectfully asks this court to uphold the Jury's
conviction of the Defendant for criminally negligent homicide.

-22-

STATEMENT REGARDING ADDENDUM

Pursuant to Utah R. App. P. 24, no addendum is required.

Dated this \Q
\Q day of November, 2006.

CHRISTOPHER G. BOWN

Deputy District Attorney
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